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ABSTRACT
This is a study of Thomas Cardinal Wolsey and his diplomatic policy between 
1518 and 1525. This period was one of great diplomatic activity between England 
and the Holy Roman Empire because Henry VIII and Charles V were allied in a 
“Great Enterprise” against France. Cardinal Wolsey was charged with implementing 
Henry VIII’s wishes for war, but did not have the financial resources to do so 
adequately. Therefore, he pursued a policy of delay until Henry VIII could go to war 
again. However, Wolsey delayed too long and eventually his diplomatic and 
financial policy collapsed. In essence, this thesis leads historians to a further 
understanding of two aspects of early-modern English history. First, it serves as a 
case study in which one can see England progressing from “medieval” to “modem.” # 
Second, and perhaps more important, it gives historians new questions to ask about 
the nature of the English Reformation.
1Introduction
“Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more . . . .  And teach them how 
to war! And you, good yeomen, Whose limbs were made in England, show us here the 
mettle of your Pasture. . . . Cry - God for Harry! England! And Saint George!”1 Thus, 
Shakespeare prepared his audience for Henry V’s victory at the Battle of Agincourt in 
1415. When discussing the French wars of Henry V’s descendant, Henry VIII, 
Shakespeare’s words bear great significance and lend a certain insight into both the role 
of monarchs in early modem Europe and England’s role in the Habsburg - Valois conflict 
between 1518 and 1525.
In essence, kings of the sixteenth century saw themselves as war leaders. Their 
purpose was to expand their domains, expand their power, and expand, their influence by 
conquering and enlarging their domains. The only way of doing this was to go to war.2 
Early modem monarchs made these wars on the pretext of dynastic claims dating back 
hundreds of years. Thomas More and many of the humanists argued against this by 
saying that monarchs should govern their own kingdoms and not try to conquer others.3 
Yet, the political reality in the sixteenth century was that France and the Holy Roman 
Empire were trying to expand into Milan, Aragon was trying to expand into both Naples 
and Navarre, Venice was trying to expand into the Holy Roman Empire, and Rome was 
trying to expand into Venice. All of these states sought to exploit the others to their best 
advantage economically, militarily, and diplomatically. This European system bred
1 William Shakespeare, Henrv V . Act III, Scene I.
2 Eugene Rice and Anthony Grafton, The Foundations of Earlv Modem Europe. Second Edition. (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1994), 118.
3 Thomas More, Utopia. Robert M. Adams, ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1992), 26.
2warfare4 and as Michael Howard points out, for most European monarchies at this time 
“It is more in the true interest of those Kingdoms in general. . .  [to] continue in a state of 
war.. . than in a state of peace.. . commerce will flourish more.. .  than under any peace 
which should allow an open intercourse... .”5
It is in this context that one should view the wars between Henry VIII of England, 
Francis I of France, and Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire. These monarchs all 
wanted martial glory for themselves and hoped to bring economic and diplomatic 
advantages to their respective dynasties. However, there is more to this war-mongering 
amongst the crowned heads of Europe. Between 1518 and 1525 there were significant 
changes in the very way warfare was carried out throughout Europe. Monarchies were 
beginning to eclipse feudal aristocracies, centralized bureaucracies were beginning to 
exert more influence over localized powers, gunpowder was beginning to revolutionize 
military organization and strategy, and, most importantly, governments were beginning to 
exert more control over taxation and finance.6 Howard describes these trends by saying 
that “The growing capacity of European governments to control, or at least to tap, the 
wealth of the community, and form it to create mechanisms - bureaucracies, fiscal 
systems, armed forces - which enabled them yet further to extend their control of the 
community, is one of the central developments”7 of the early modem era.
England was no exception to this. Steven Gunn has argued that England’s 
invasion of France in 1523 “might justly be seen as the watershed between medieval and
4 Steven Gunn, “The French Wars o f Henry VIII,” 28-29.
5 Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 48.
6 Eugene Rice and Anthony Grafton, The Foundations o f Earlv Modem Europe. 1460-1559. 110-124.
7 Michael Howard, War in European History. 49.
3modem English strategy.”8 Gunn defined “medieval” as England’s direct military 
intervention in European affairs and “modem” as “English manipulation of the struggles 
of other European powers.”9 In essence, when one looks at the “Great Enterprise” (Henry 
VIIFs and Charles V’s term for the invasion of France between 1521 and 1523), this 
thesis is true not only militarily, but also diplomatically and economically. Therefore, it 
might be useful to expand that thesis, taking into consideration not only military strategy 
but also the other trends of the sixteenth century. Thus, one can understand “modem” as 
both English manipulation of European conflicts and as greater “centralization” of 
control over England’s financial resources, and “medieval” as both direct military 
intervention in European affairs and “decentralization” of control over financial 
resources.
Therefore, in a fundamental way, England’s diplomatic and economic policies 
between 1518 and 1525 were a “watershed” between “medieval” and “modem.” 
Diplomatically, Wolsey was manipulating European affairs to England’s best advantage. 
Economically, he was reforming government and attempting to make finances more 
efficient. Why was he doing this? He wanted to bring military glory to his master, 
Henry VIII. So, one can see how Wolsey, under these definitions of “medieval” and 
“modem,” would be considered “modem” and Henry VIII “medieval.” However, these 
“modem” ideals were just beginning to develop. Wolsey certainly would not have 
considered himself “modem.” In fact, his own words contradict such usage. When in 
1525 Henry VIII’s council urged Wolsey to manipulate affairs and not to intervene
8 Steven Gunn, “The Duke o f Suffolk’s March on Paris in 1523,” The English Historical Review. 101 
(1986), 631.
9 Ibid.
4directly, he retorted with a fable about men who sheltered in caves from the rain. These 
men then hoped to rule over those who did not go into the cave with them (“wetted 
fools”)- However, once it stopped raining, their plan failed.10 Therefore, one can clearly 
see that Wolsey did not want England to isolate itself from Europe.
So, how is one supposed to read the contradictory evidence in this “watershed”? 
The answer is not simple. Sixteenth-century politics were very complex and very fluid. 
Diplomacy was even more fluid. Monarchs made and broke treaties with ease and often 
do not seem to have any uniform alliances with anyone.11 As a result, it is difficult to 
determine what is happening in foreign policy during this period. David Potter perhaps 
puts it best when he argued that “foreign policy became a matter of day-to-day tactics 
rather than of long-term planning.”12 That is certainly the case with England’s foreign 
policy between 1518 and 1525.
Henry VIII wanted war. He wanted to become king of France and he wanted to
t ^put himself into the center of European politics. Charles V wanted an ally against 
France in his upcoming war.14 In 1521, Henry VIII and Charles V enjoyed a solid 
alliance which showed no indications of breaking down. The war was proceeding well 
for Charles V, and Francis I was becoming weaker. In 1523, it seemed that Henry VIII’s 
dream of military conquest in France and Charles V’s desire to bring Francis to his knees 
was about to come true. By 1525, relations between England and the Holy Roman
10 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic o f the Reign of Henrv VIII. (London: Public 
Record Office, 1920), vii, 1114.
11 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1970), 162.
12 David Potter, “Foreign Policy” in Diarmaid MacCulloch, ed. The Reign of Henrv VIII: Politics. Policy, 
and Pietv. (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1995), 133.
13 Steven Gunn, “The French Wars o f Henry VIII,” in Jeremy Black, ed. The Origins o f War in Early 
Modem Europe. (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1987), 28.
5Empire had collapsed completely. Henry VIII’s policy had not changed. In 1525, Henry 
still planned to invade France and follow through on the alliance, Charles V’s policy had 
changed and he snubbed Henry VIII.15 Why?
The effect of the actions of the two monarchs was to pull Henry VIII’s chief 
minister, Thomas Cardinal Wolsey in opposite directions. Wolsey’s duty was to bring 
glory to his master, and, thus he supported Henry VIII’s alliance with Charles V against 
Francis I. There are no indications (that the evidence will support) that Wolsey wanted 
peace or acted in contradiction to Henry VIII’s orders.16 However, he did not have the 
resources to carry out a full-scale war, so he tried to follow Henry VIII’s orders in the 
best way he could. In a certain sense, one can view both Henry VIII and Charles V as 
“medieval.” They supported direct military intervention and had very inefficient 
“decentralized” methods of obtaining revenues for this military intervention. Wolsey 
combined both approaches. He, too, was “medieval,” and supported military intervention 
in Europe. He too had a “decentralized” government apparatus. However, he was also 
“modem.” Because he did not have the means to carry out military intervention in 
France, he manipulated European affairs to England’s best advantage and attempted to 
“centralize” and make English war-making more efficient.
Wolsey did not make these changes because of great principles or a desire to 
“modernize” the English system of government. He made these changes on a day-to-day 
basis (as Potter pointed out). Because of constraints, Wolsey employed “modem”
14 Geoffrey Parker, “The Political World of Charles V,” in Geoffrey Parker, ed. Charles V. (Antwerp: 
Mercatorfonds, 1999), 17.
15 J. J. Scarisbrick, Henrv VIII. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), 138.
16 George Bernard. War. Taxation, and Rebellion in Earlv Tudor England. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1986), 44.
6methods of diplomacy and finance. In addition, one might be able argue that this 
anticipated what would later happen under Thomas Cromwell. In essence, one can see 
how the period between 1518 and 1525 was a transitional one in English foreign and 
economic policy. By looking briefly at the events between 1518 and 1525, the policies 
and ambitions of Henry VIII and Charles V, and especially the politics of Cardinal 
Wolsey, it becomes clear that Wolsey employed “modem” techniques in order to sustain 
a “medieval” policy of his master. In the end, however, this was a policy that Wolsey 
was unable to maintain.
7Chapter 1 
Henry VIII
Shakespeare’s words “Once more unto the breach, dear friends. . calls to mind 
Henry VIII’s martial desires and qualities. Henry VIII’s model was Henry V, and Henry 
VIII imitated Henry V in an almost ritualistic fashion.1 He sought to revive the Hundred 
Years War and bring a golden age back to England. His father, Henry VII, had brought 
England out of civil war and had left his son with a sizeable treasury. Henry VIII wanted 
to revive Henry V’s martial glory and “imperial” kingship. Hence the rhetoric used for 
Henry VIII’s three invasions of France in 1513, 1523, and 1543. Since France was the 
traditional enemy, and England was not strong enough to support an invasion of France 
alone, Hemy needed an ally. Therefore, an alliance between England and some other 
European power was needed. In the 1520s the choice was obvious, and Henry VIII chose 
to ally himself with Charles V.
Henry VIII followed a pro-Habsburg and pro-Burgundian policy not unlike that of 
his father and ancestors before him. In fact, one can trace Burgundian influences to 
Edward IV, who started looking to that court as a model. Henry VII, conscious of that 
tradition, continued it and imported architectural, artistic and poetic styles, and even 
ceremonies from the court of the Burgundian dukes. One of the most striking examples 
of this is Henry VII’s emulation of the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece within his
1 Steven Gunn, “The French Wars o f Henry VIII,” in Jeremy Black, ed. The Origins of War in Early 
Modem Europe. (Edibnburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1987), 36-37.
2 Dale Hoak, “The Iconography of the Crown Imperial, in Dale Hoak, ed. Tudor Political Culture. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 59-60.
3 Sydney Anglo, ed. Chivalry in the Renaissance (New York: The Boydell Press, 1990) 121.
8own chivalric Order of the Garter.4 Charles Habsburg was the Duke of Burgundy from 
1515, and Henry VIII, continuing the traditions of his father, looked to that court for 
inspiration in his own.
However, this pro-Habsburg approach of Henry VIII stemmed not only from the 
fact that Charles Habsburg was Duke of Burgundy, but also from the alliance system that 
his father had devised before Charles inherited Burgundy. Henry VII had hoped to marry 
Archduchess Margaret of Austria, Charles’s aunt, and later Charles’s regent in the 
Netherlands.5 Also there was talk in Henry VII’s council of the future Henry VIII’s 
marriage to Eleanor, Charles’s sister. The Habsburgs also sought to ally themselves with 
the Tudors. Emperor Maximilian I favored the marriage of the future Henry VIII and 
Eleanor as well, and sent an ambassador to Henry VII in order to negotiate it.6 Even the 
marriage to Catherine of Aragon had some connections to the Habsburgs, and one cannot 
underestimate her influence over Henry VIII with regard to the imperial alliance. 
Catherine was the sister of Joanna of Castile, who was Maximilian’s daughter-in-law and 
Charles’s mother. One can see how even in Henry VII’s time the Tudor line was very 
closely tied to that of the Habsburgs; Henry VIII carried forward that policy, and tried to 
secure the marriage of his own daughter, Mary, to Charles V in 1522.7
Henry VIII also wanted such an alliance because of his own competition with 
Francis I, King of France. The two were similar in stature, learning, and physical 
prowess, and competed for the title of the true “Renaissance Prince.” Henry VIII was
4 Gordon Kipling, The Triumph of Honour: Burgundian Origins of the Elizabethan Renaissance. (The 
Hague: Leiden University Press, 1977), 18.
5 Karl Brandi, The Emperor Charles V . (Oxford: The Alden Press, 1939) 45.
6 J. J. Scarisbrick, Henrv VIII. (Los Angeles: The University o f California Press, 1968), 10.
7 R. B. Wemham, Before the Armada. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966), 100.
9always contending with Francis and had designs himself on becoming the King of 
France. By 1522 Henry spoke of his campaign to reclaim his rights as king of France and 
to invade France with the Holy Roman Emperor, as he had done in 1513 and would do 
again in 1543.8 Henry VIII saw himself as another Henry V, and sought to carve up 
France and make himself an “emperor” in his own right. One can see this quite clearly in 
the imperial imagery prevalent in the joint entry of Charles V and Henry VIII into 
London in 1522,9 and in Henry’s own intentions, as he stated to Charles in 1525 
regarding a joint invasion of France and a division of French lands between the two 
monarchs in the wake of Pavia.10 This conception of “imperial kinship was also clearly 
prevalent in the iconography of England’s “imperial” crown between 1509 and 1522.11 
Henry VIII claimed that “his line [Francis I’s] ought to be abolished, removed and utterly 
extinct” and that Henry should become King of France “by just title of inheritance.”12
This policy did not change between 1518 and 1525. Charles V was Henry VIII’s 
opportunity to become the great imperial monarch, like his idol Henry V. In 1522, the 
two monarchs signed the Treaty of Windsor and solidified their alliance. To Henry VIII, 
this alliance was vital. There was no other way to achieve his ambitions. Also, there was 
another motive to this alliance. Henry VIII had no male heir, and, if he died 
unexpectedly, England would be left with a six-year-old queen. The last time that 
England had been left with a female ruler, Queen Matilda in 1135, nearly twenty years of
8 J. J. Scarisbrick, Henrv VIII. 87.
9 Sydney Anglo, Spectacle. Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), 196.
10 J. J. Scarisbrick, Henrv VIII. 136-138.
11 Dale Hoak, “The Iconography of the Crown Imperial,” 54-103.
12 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. IV, 1212.
10
civil war had ensued. England had just recovered from the “Wars of the Roses” in 1485 
and Henry feared for the future of his dynasty.
Catherine of Aragon was now 36 and had had eight children, seven of whom had 
died. It was increasingly unlikely that she would have another boy. Therefore, the only 
option open to Henry was to marry his daughter Mary off to some prince who could 
defend her claim. Charles was the natural choice. He could not only defend his claim, 
but, when Henry VIII died, Charles V would become King of England, Ireland and 
France (Henry VIII’s titles) as well as Holy Roman Emperor, King of Spain, and Duke of 
Burgundy. Thus, Charles would be, as Henry termed it, “lord and owner. . . of all 
Christendom.”13 This Anglo-Imperial alliance would be the answer to all of Henry Vni’s 
problems, and would fulfill the dreams of the humanists, like Erasmus, who called for a 
universal peace among all Christians which could be achieved by such a union. Such a 
union could not be refused by Charles V, given Charles’s circumstances in 1522.
13 Ibid.
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Chapter 2 
Charles V
Charles thought that England would provide an excellent ally in these wars. 
England was a hitherto untapped source of wealth, and Henry VIII’s father had 
reportedly left his son with a vast fortune. Charles would have known about this, and 
sought to exploit it to his advantage. In addition, Henry VIII had had some success in 
his last campaign against France, and seemed eager to renew it again.1 Charles also 
sought to maintain the alliance that his grandfather had wrought, and sought Mary’s 
hand to cement it.2 England was the most powerful European power (next to France 
and the Empire) economically and militarily and could seriously threaten Imperial 
interests if allied with France. If England allied with France, it could cut off Spain 
and the Netherlands, thus cutting the Empire off from lucrative overseas trade, and 
therby effectively cutting Charles’s empire in half. Hence the alliance made great 
sense from the Imperial point of view.
The marriage to Mary was also very attractive to Charles in 1522. Margaret 
of Austria, Charles’s regent in the Netherlands, believed that an English alliance was 
absolutely vital, and stressed that belief to Charles quite vehemently. Charles also 
liked the prospect of becoming King of England. Even if he did not conquer France 
this time, he would be able to surround it completely via this English alliance. 
Charles also seemed to show a strong love for his English relatives, perhaps because 
of the influence of Margaret. In addition to calling Henry VIII, “my good uncle,
1 Karl Brandi, Charles V. 160.
12
brother and father” he showed this love through his actions at the English court. One 
English courtier said, “the emperor made such a semblant love to the English court 
that he won the love of the Englishmen.”4 Mary could definitely help to achieve 
Charles’s ambitions as well as Henry’s.
In addition, Charles V was eager for this alliance because of problems within 
his own dominions. His ministers were far from united in support of their master and 
more often than not they promoted different policies. Margaret of Austria, regent of 
the Netherlands, the most outstanding example, was criticized for being too pro- 
English in her own policies, sometimes more pro-English than Charles himself.5
Furthermore, factions within the Empire were of divided opinion on the 
advisability of the war. The Burgundian faction was pro-French and predictably did 
not support Charles’s war efforts. The Burgundians supported Francis I’s aims in 
Italy, and felt that Charles’s claims to Italy were not well grounded. These councilors 
were particularly strong in the Netherlands, and Margaret had great difficulty there 
trying to restrain her pro-French courtiers. In some cases Margaret could not provide 
the money and supplies that Charles and Wolsey demanded because her ministers 
would not cooperate.6 On the other side of the coin were the anti-French Spanish 
factions who supported Charles’s aims in Italy; they were pro-English if only to 
secure help against the French.7 The struggles between these very divergent groups
2 J. G. Russell, “The Search for Universal Peace.. .”,176.
3 M. J. Rodriguez-Salgado, “Charles V and the Dynasty,” in Geoffrey Parker, ed. Charles V. 15.
4 Ibid, 16.
5 Geoffrey Parker, “The Political World o f Charles V,” 6.
6 Ibid, 8.
7 Ibid, 18.
13
caused significant problems in the execution of Imperial war policy. These struggles 
made the need for an alliance more necessary.
As if those problems were not enough for Charles, the Turks were pressing 
ever forward into his Austrian possessions and Martin Luther’s preaching divided the 
Church within the Empire. Charles’s New World possessions were developing, and, 
as a major source of revenue, they required a certain amount of attention. The Diet of 
Worms was scheduled to meet in 1523 and Charles also had to deal with revolts in his 
German domains. He had so many problems besetting him on many fronts that he did 
not have the military and financial resources necessary to deal with the French war. 
Troops and money were needed from an outside source, and England seemed to be 
the best choice in the 1520s.8 Therefore, Charles courted Wolsey by promising him 
his support in the upcoming papal election. During the conference of 1521 he wrote 
very warm letters, “Monsier, le Cardinal. . . .  I cannot persuade myself that your 
intentions are otherwise than upright, knowing the care and solicitude that you have 
always shown in our mutual affairs. . . In doing which I shall have occasion to know 
and appreciate your good intentions... Your good friend, Charles.”9
When Wolsey did not give the support that he had promised and did not 
support the military effort with as much vigor as he said he would, the emperor was 
furious. The entire effort was very poorly planned, and England did not give him 
what he needed and wanted. To Charles, this seemed like a breach of contract. No 
matter how much he begged and pleaded, the money and troops agreed upon were not
8 Ibid, 46.
14
forthcoming because Wolsey delayed sending important shipments of money and 
supplies to the war front.10 After Wolsey’s negotiations with France in 1524, that 
breach led to cold relations between the two, and, after Charles’s victory at Pavia in 
1525, that change in policy cost Wolsey his victory. Henry VIII had expected this to 
be the achievement of his dreams: “Now is the time for the emperor and myself to 
devise the means of getting full satisfaction from France. Not an hour is to be lost.”11 
That “satisfaction” was not forthcoming and neither Henry nor Charles had gained 
any of the aims that they desired, primarily because of Wolsey, on whom all of the 
hopes of the “Great Enterprise” hinged.
9 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic of the Reign o f Henrv VIII. (London: Great 
Britain Public Record Office, 1920), II ii.
10 R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada. 106.
11 J. Bergenroth, ed. Calendar of Letters. Dispatches, and State Papers Relating to the Negotiations 
Between England and Spain. (London: Great Britain Public Record Office, 1866), iii, 82.
15
Chapter 3 
Cardinal Wolsey: Pro-Peace 1518-1520
The Treaty of London of 1518 was the cornerstone of English policy during 
the years before to the Great Enterprise. Leo X had called for a crusade against the 
Turks, and Wolsey cleverly used the opportunity to put England in the position of 
“Arbiter of Europe.” The purpose of this treaty seems to have been based on a false 
premise. Neither England nor any other power of Europe actually intended to start a 
crusade, and England could not because of the financial cost of the invasion of France 
in 1513. However, by capitalizing on this opportunity, Wolsey was able to put his 
master where he desired to be, at the center of European politics, without actually 
having to commit England to further financial obligations. In addition, Wolsey was 
able to become a legatus a latere because “it was not the manner of this realm to 
admit legatos a latere” (meaning an Italian legatos a latere)} In essence, Wolsey 
was able to use this situation to further his own ambitions (to obtain more power 
within and outside England), as well as Henry VnTs.
Wolsey was able to conclude a treaty with all of the powers of Europe, one 
that followed the Pope’s plan, which itself was based on the precedents of Italian 
treaties, such as the Treaty of Lodi of 1454. It stipulated that if any power suffered 
aggression, the other powers would come to its aid until peace was restored. In 
addition, all powers would allow troops to move across their territories, and no power
1 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. II, 4034.
16
could hire foreign mercenaries. Finally, all former treaties were null and void. This 
treaty exemplified the humanists’ call toward universal Christian peace, as laid out by 
Erasmus in the Querella Pads, and made Henry the great humanist prince who would 
bring about a new age of learning and amity unparalleled in European history. 
Bishop Foxe praised Wolsey by saying that, “undoubtedly, my Lord, God continuing 
it, it shall be the best that ever was done for the realm of England; and after the king’s 
highness, the laud and praise shall be to you a perpetual memory.”4 The Venetian 
ambassador said that “I lauded this excellent project, and told him (Wolsey) he could 
do nothing more glorious in the world, or that could add greater splendour to his 
eminent qualities than in the midst of great strife amongst princes to prove himself 
that lapis angularis which joined the two detached walls of the temple.”5
The treaty was followed with much celebration. In October 1518 Wolsey 
marshaled the clergy of England to make a statement about the need for peace and 
crusade,6 and employed Richard Pace to deliver the oration. Hall described it by 
saying, “the kyng and Ambassadours. . . roade to the church of saynct Paul. . . with 
the highest step. . .that the kyng and the Ambassadors might be sene.”7 The same 
day, it was announced that the Princess Mary would marry the Dauphin, that Henry 
and Francis would meet as a gesture of dedication to the treaty, and that Henry would
2 Ibid, n, 1440
3 J. J. Scarisbrick, Henrv VIII. 72.
4 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. II, 4540.
5 R. Brown, Calendar of State Papers. Venetian. II, 177.
6 Ibid, 221-222.
7 Edward Hall, Chronicle. 594.
17
return the English occupied city of Toumai.8 In fact, the celebrations at court were 
so magnificent during this year that the Venetian ambassador remarked that the pomp 
was greater and more sumptuous than he had yet seen.9 It was hoped that this 
outward display of friendship toward the Francis would ease negotiations with him, 
and lessen the threat of invasion.
However important this treaty may have looked on the surface, it lacked 
substance. In attempting to put this treaty into action Wolsey made several 
questionable assumptions. The first was the existence of three powers on the 
Continent. In 1518, these were Emperor Maximilian, King Charles of Spain, and 
King Francis of France. Francis was economically and militarily the most powerful 
of the three; should he cause any trouble, the ensuing diplomatic confusion would 
give Henry enough time to live up to his obligations under the treaty. In other words, 
if Francis invaded anyone, Henry VIII would be able to demand a peace conference 
that would give England time to prepare for war, if needed. Secondly, Wolsey knew 
that Maximilian would not ally with Charles against Francis for any extended period 
of time. Maximilian had always been known to go with the highest bidder in military 
and diplomatic relations (as Henry’s war with France in 1513 had shown), and there 
was little reason to assume that he would not do the same again, given the 
opportunity. As a result, Charles would not be able to take on Francis alone. Spain 
did not have the money or resources to combat France without the Emperor’s help. 
Thirdly, the treaty assumed that Italy would be the scene of future altercations in
8 R. Brown, Calendar o f State Papers. Venetian. II, 1085.
18
Europe. Both Charles and Francis had claims in Italy that they vehemently fought 
over, and though these claims were often rhetorical, Maximilian had none. Therefore, 
if Francis and Charles declared war against each other over Italy, it was unlikely the 
Maximilian would come to the aid of one or the other.10
Wolsey’s peace policy rested on Maximilian’s longevity, but the Emperor 
died in 1519. This was something obviously unforeseeable in 1518, and, after the 
election of Charles, the policy of peace collapsed. Now there were only two powers 
on the continent, and those powers were of roughly equal might militarily and 
economically. Both had an interest in Italy, and conflict was inevitable. Wolsey tried 
to maintain his policy of peace and keep England from entering the conflicts arising 
between Francis and Charles. The plans for Henry and Francis to meet had already 
been put into motion by that time, and it was too late to withdraw them, even though 
it was probably only a matter of time before Henry declared war on Francis and 
supported Charles. Such was the background to what was to be the most sumptuous 
display of Wolsey’s treaty of Universal Peace, the Field of the Cloth of Gold. The 
Venetian ambassador perhaps put it most succinctly, “These sovereigns are not at 
peace.. . they hate each other cordially.”11 So great was English hatred of the French 
that the Marquis of Dorset claimed that if he had a drop of French blood in his body 
“he would cut himself open to get rid of it.”12
9 Ibid, 282.
10 Peter Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal. 58-103.
11 R. Brown, Calendar of State Papers. Venetian. Ill, 108.
12 Ibid, 109.
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Wolsey’s policy of peace was unsustainable. The rivalry between Henry and 
Francis, even at a time when they were ostensibly promoting peace, shows just how 
fragile that peace was. All of the monarchs who signed the treaty actually moved to 
negate it. Charles, seeking to destroy the alliance between England and France, met 
with Henry just before he left for Calais and tried to secure an anti-French alliance.13 
Charles hoped that this would nullify the encounter between Francis and Henry.14 
Pope Clement VII later claimed that the treaty was a usurpation of Rome’s position 
and stated “from it we can see what the Holy See and the pope have to expect from 
the English Chancellor.”15 When war broke out between Charles and Francis the next 
year, England had to take a position. Henry wished to ally himself with the Emperor, 
and Wolsey knew that more time was needed for preparation for war. Therefore, 
Wolsey attempted to enforce his treaty. Thus began the Conferences at Calais and 
Bruges in 1521.
13 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 936.
14 Ibid, III, 551.
15 J. J. Scarisbrick, HenrvVIII. 73.
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Chapter 4
Cardinal Wolsey: Pro-Imperialism 1521-1523
After the collapse of Wolsey’s peace policy and the beginning of the Habsburg/ 
Valois war, it became necessary, despite the economic difficulties, to initiate a policy 
favoring the Holy Roman Emperor. This is what Henry VIII strongly desired and what 
Wolsey was hoping to delay as long as possible, because England was still not ready for a 
large-scale invasion of Europe. In 1521, this inherent contradiction in English policy 
came to the fore. Wolsey was given contradictory orders both to conclude an Imperial 
alliance favorable to Henry VIII and to negotiate a peace settlement between Francis and 
Charles according to the terms of the 1518 Treaty of London. Hence, the very confusing 
diplomatic maneuvering at Calais and Bruges began. Wolsey somehow had to ensure 
both Charles and Francis that his master had their best interests at heart. For as long as 
possible Wolsey tried to assure both of them that England would come to their aid. By 
1522, this became impossible, and Wolsey and Henry concluded a treaty with Charles V 
at Windsor. However, even after Henry signed the 1522 treaty, the imperial 
ambassador’s reports make it clear that Wolsey intended to delay the implementation of 
the treaty as long as possible.
J. J. Scarisbrick has argued that during these years “Wolsey’s policy was a peace 
policy. . . -”1 Peter Gwyn claims that Wolsey’s aim was “to bring an alliance about with 
the Emperor.”2 In truth, his objective was to do both. Henry VIII firmly desired an 
alliance with the Emperor in 1521, and Wolsey was obligated to conform to the 
diplomatic policy of the king. However, Wolsey also keenly understood the financial
1 J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII. 49.
2 Peter Gwyn, “Wolsey’s Foreign Policy,” 755.
21
situation of England and knew that Henry did not have the money to carry out a war for 
any length of time, so peace was a necessary goal. Therefore, although an imperial 
alliance was inevitable, his plan in these seemingly contradictory conferences was to 
please both sides and keep England in the middle until it became impossible to do so. If 
he delayed long enough, the war, he thought, might end and England would have more 
time to prepare for another conflict between the two most powerful dynasties of 
sixteenth-century Europe. Even after England was firmly committed to the Imperial 
cause in 1522, Wolsey continued this policy of delay until 1523, when the military 
opportunity brought on by the Due de Bourbon’s defection forced England to intercede 
on Charles’s behalf.
The period from July to November 1521 seemed to be full of contradictions. The 
meeting of the three chancellors, Thomas Wolsey of England, Mercurio de Gattinara of 
the Holy Roman Empire, and Antoine Duprat of France, accompanied by the Papal
nuncio, Geronimo Ghinucci, appeared to constitute nothing more than display. War had
f
already begun between Francis and Charles, and both wished to make Henry their ally. 
At the outbreak of war, Wolsey, ostensibly carrying out the terms of the 1518 Treaty of 
London, called for arbitration to prevent “the effusion of Christian blood. . . the 
consuming of treasure, subversion of realms, depopulation and desolation of countries 
and other infinite inconveniences... .”3
The consuming of treasure was probably one of Wolsey’s chief concerns, as 
England had none by this time. What might seem to a modem reader to be some kind of 
Machiavellian subterfuge on Wolsey’s part (either to obtain an Imperial alliance and 
deceive the French, or to obtain a peace settlement and to deceive the Imperialists), was
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probably not Wolsey’s intention. Wolsey did not wish to undo all of the work he had 
done prior to these conferences. He claimed in 1521 that he did not want to abandon the 
Treaty of London.4 In that sense, he was working for peace. On the other hand, France 
was the natural enemy of England, and Wolsey had to conform to his master’s wishes for 
an alliance with the Emperor. Henry openly declared his intention to recover land in 
France and stated that French aggression against his natural ally in 1521 gave him cause 
to intervene.5 Charles had insisted that Wolsey visit him at Bruges as a condition of 
sending his chancellor to Calais.6 The initiative for this conference between Charles and 
Wolsey at Bruges came either from Charles himself, or, perhaps, from Margaret of 
Austria. What was Wolsey’s primary aim at these conferences? The answer was delay. 
Wolsey knew that any number of things could happen and England was in quite a good 
bargaining position. Both Charles and Francis were short of money and needed English 
aid. Wolsey could use that knowledge in order to bargain and to obtain favorable
o
concessions from both sides without committing Henry to military intervention.
At Calais, Wolsey bargained with both the French and the Imperialists in order to 
get as many concessions as possible. In fact, he insisted on obtaining these points from 
the French king, or, Wolsey threatened, Henry would ally with the Emperor.9 In fact, 
Wolsey considered himself so successful in obtaining these concessions that he boasted 
that “he (Francis) is now bound, your Grace (Henry) at large.”10 The first of these 
concessions Wolsey won from Francis had to do with fishing rights and communications.
3 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 1270.
4 Ibid, III, 1556.
5 Ibid, 111, 1440.
6 Ibid, HI, 1213.
1 Ibid,III, 1283.
8 J. Bergenroth, Calendar o f State Papers Spanish. II, 337.
9 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 1383.
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He desired, and won, freedom of fishing rights, freedom of communication of the 
ambassadors and their messengers, freedom of access to Calais for the victuallers, and the 
assurance from the French that the havens, ports, rivers and lands of the king of England 
would be free from attack and safe for all.11 He also obtained from Francis and Louise of 
Savoy an agreement to abandon Francis’s campaigns around Toumai and to concentrate 
his efforts in Artois.12 So happy was Louise of Savoy over this peace that Wolsey had 
secured that she called him “my son and my good friend.”13
What did these concessions from the French gain for Henry? Because of 
Wolsey’s negotiations, Henry no longer had to worry about French incursion into , 
England’s fishing waters or disruption of trade and provisioning of Calais. He did not 
have to worry about ambassadors either English or foreign being hindered during 
England’s time of neutrality, or any kind of attack on English soil by the French. Thus, 
even if England went to war against France, the threat of invasion by the French was less 
likely. Wolsey bought England time without having to worry about French disruption of 
its trade because of war. Thus, Francis could not try to draw Henry to his side by moving 
toward Calais or ruining the English economy.
Wolsey did not focus his energies entirely on the French, however. He also 
compromised with the Imperialists during his time at Bruges. Wolsey was not expected to 
publicize the alliance and England did not have to declare war until March 1523, nearly 
two years away.14 In addition, Wolsey secured an agreement for the betrothal of the 
Princess Mary to Charles, the continued payment of the French pension to Henry VIII
10 Ibid, III, 1443.
11 Ibid, III, 1524.
12 Ibid, 111, 1710.
13 Ibid, III, 1202.
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(since France would inevitably stop paying it after a declaration of war), and a promise 
from Charles that he would not negotiate with France (without giving a similar promise 
for England). At the same time, Wolsey advanced Henry’s wishes for a new European 
order. England and the Empire would divide France between themselves.15 So important 
was this, that Edward Hall claimed Wolsey, “immediately after his arivyng (back at 
Calais) he treated them (the French ambassadors) of peace, yet not so emestly as he did 
before and that perceived the sayd ambassadors and wrote therof to the Frenche kynge.”16 
This statement of Hall’s was probably written after the fact, but it is beyond doubt that 
Wolsey got what he wanted from the Imperialists.
The commissions Wolsey received from Henry stated that he was to mediate 
between the combatants, to conclude a treaty with the Emperor against Francis, to treat 
for a closer amity with France against the Emperor, and to treat for a confederation of the 
pope, emperor, and the king of France.17 He did exactly that. He had concluded a treaty 
with Charles, though it did not have to be publicized for another two years. This gave 
Wolsey ample time either to make preparations or switch sides (whichever became most 
practicable). He assured the French that Henry was interested in their welfare, and 
Francis reciprocated by claiming that he trusted Wolsey implicitly with the “amity” and 
hoped only for good between France and England.18 Wolsey concluded a shaky truce 
between France and the Empire, which again gave Wolsey time to maneuver, and that 
truce was meant to facilitate the further preparations for a crusade against the Turks (as
14 Peter Gwyn, “Wolsey’s Foreign Policy,” 765.
15 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 1508-1509.
16 Edward Hall, Chronicle. 231.
17 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 1443. Also J. J. Scarisbrick, Henrv VIII. 86.
18 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 1904.
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dictated by the Treaty of London).19 Unfortunately however, these conferences 
accomplished little else than display. The peace process was not helped greatly, the war 
effort was helped little, and England stayed firmly in the middle, not committing either to 
war or peace. Wolsey was able to gain time without promising much. At this point, the 
imperial alliance was cemented, yet could easily be broken. Wolsey had, according to 
Henry VIII himself, “furnished in all degrees and purposes most likest a great prince, 
which was much to the high honour of the King’s majesty and of his realm. . . .  by 
whose counsel, devotion, and industry, he had been able to achieve greater things than 
all his predecessors in so many wars and battles.” This praise would not only have 
suited Wolsey’s own ego, but gave him the time he needed to delay, at least until 1522.
However, even when the alliance between England and the Empire was confirmed 
and England had declared war in 1523, there were significant delays. The Imperial 
ambassador, Louis de Praet, fumed over what he saw as Wolsey’s obstinate refusal to 
cooperate. Soon after the confirmation of the Treaty of Windsor and just before the Duke 
of Suffolk’s invasion in 1523, de Praet said that Henry and Wolsey, “could no wise be 
satisfied. . .” and that they insisted on a delay of “one or two years. . . .”21 De Praet 
described in detail how Wolsey was delaying, “perceiving that the Cardinal wished only 
to put some appearance of justice on his side, without any desire to advance the business 
at hand.” De Praet claimed that when he tried to put forth the business of the war Wolsey 
“became more difficult and . . .complained.” De Praet also accused Wolsey of making 
“reproachful words against your Majesty in his accustomed manner, and saying that it
19 Ibid, 1786.
20 Ibid, 1519.
21 William Bradford, The Correspondence o f Charles V. 54-55.
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was proper to wait. . . .”22 De Praet declared that Wolsey, even in the presence of Henry 
VIII, remained obstinate, and “took up the argument, and announcing the thing (the 
invasion of France) was not feasible. . . the co-operation proposed was not on equal 
terms. . . and were ready to abandon their part of their demand. . . . ” In other words, 
according to de Praet, Wolsey wanted to stop supplying money and troops for the 
invasion of France because he felt England was contributing more than Charles V was.
De Praet was far from an impartial observer, and did not always show the amount 
of restraint he perhaps should have, but through his correspondence one can see how 
Wolsey was trying to delay, even shortly after the alliance had been made. The same is 
evident in Wolsey’s own letters to the Emperor. He wrote that he wanted “to seek the 
ways of peace and to make honourable and reasonable offers for the same.”24 During the 
invasion, he told the Emperor that he and Henry had changed plans and wished to invade 
Paris in the hopes that it would end the war more quickly.25 All of these delays and 
desires to get the war finished more quickly had to do with finance.
22 Ibid, 57-58.
23 Ibid, 59.
24 J.S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 2537.
25 Ibid, IV, 61.
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Chapter 5 
War: 1521-1523
Despite the incredibly good financial situation that Henry VII left to his son, 
Henry VIII very quickly depleted his father’s fortune and left England in so precarious a 
situation that he had to find a way of rescuing England from virtual bankruptcy. Thus, 
Wolsey had to pay for Henry VIII’s war with very limited financial resources. Generally, 
historians have agreed that royal financial reserves in 1525 were significantly depleted 
from what they had been in 1509.1 However, it is very difficult to reconstruct income 
and expenditures during Henry VIITs reign, one can only do so accurately from 1536 to 
1547, the only years for which relevant records exist. Therefore, one has to make some 
very broad assumptions. Yet, when one looks at the actions of Wolsey in the Parliament 
of 1523, the Parliament convened to finance the “Great Enterprise,” it is important to try 
to understand his financial outlook. The following analysis is far from definitive. If one 
looks at these numbers not as a penny-by-penny account of royal finances but as 
representative of some very general trends, one can gauge the impact of finance on Henry 
and Wolsey’s foreign policy between 1518 and 1525.
Since many records are missing, such as the receipts of the treasurer of the 
chamber and the Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1509 and 1525, the critical years 
of Henry VIII’s first and second French wars, one has to make deductions from other 
sources in order to arrive at even a partial picture of England’s financial situation. The 
only two studies one can use are F. C. Dietz’s overview of Tudor finance, published in
1 Richard Hoyle, “War and Public Finance,” in Diarmaid MacCulloch, ed. The Reign of Henrv VIII. (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).
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1921, and Richard Hoyle’s more recent attempt to understand the financial basis of 
English war-making during Henry VIIPs reign. The four charts following, including the 
income, expenditure, and deficit/surplus of finances between 1509 and 1525 use those 
sources as a starting point.2
The first figure tries to arrive at an idea of Henry VIIPs income. The first column 
details the expenses of the exchequer. Since the records are missing, one has to go back 
to Henry VIPs reign to look at the detailed accounts of that time. Ideally, one should be 
able to use the later years of Henry VIIPs reign and get an average using figures between 
1536 and 1546. But, in the 1540s, the dissolution of the monasteries significantly inflates 
the income of the crown, and thus significantly inflates the overall average (so much so 
that Henry VIII appears to be doing well financially in 1525, which is very unlikely). 
When one calculates the average amount of money coming into the exchequer between 
1485 and 1509, one arrives at £44,000. Using the same method for the Chamber, one 
arrives at the figure of £66,176. Admittedly, it is unlikely that income would have 
remained static for sixteen years. However, these figures offer a useful frame of 
reference.
The Savings column in the charts demonstrates the amount of money left to 
Henry VIII by his father. The Venetian ambassador reported in 1531 that it was 
£1,300,000,4 and that is the amount used in this chart. Henry VIIPs French pension, 
according to Hoyle and Potter, was about £21,316 and that amount appears to have been 
static throughout the reign, except when England and France were at war (1513-1514 and
2 Unless otherwise noted, all the numbers for these charts comes from F.C. Dietz English Public Finance. 
(Urbana, 111: University o f Illinois Press, 1920), 51-116. And Richard Hoyle, “War and Public Finance.”
3 Richard Hoyle, “War and Public Finance,” 91.
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1522-1524), when it appears at 0. The Extraordinary income is all income collected by 
Henry VIII and Wolsey through parliamentary grants, forced loans, and other grants and 
subsidies given to the Crown from any other source (such as the grants of convocation).
The second figure details Expenditures during the reign. Again the records are 
missing, so once again has to go back to the reign of Henry VII and extrapolate by 
averaging the expenditures of the last five years of Henry VII’s reign and carrying them 
forward into Henry VIII’s reign. Thus one arrives at £76,503. This is most likely a very 
conservative estimate and does not allow for inflation. The column entitled War takes 
into account additional expenses for Henry VIII’s wars with France, expenses not 
included elsewhere.
The Totals figure lists governmental surpluses and deficits and this is displayed 
graphically in the chart entitled War Finance 1509-1525. By putting the expenditures for 
every year in one and the government’s cash in hand in the other column, one can see 
how England fared financially during the early years of Henry VIII’s reign. At the 
beginning of the reign, the government had at its disposal
approximately £1,569,736, and remained in fairly good financial shape until the first war 
with France. By the time Henry made peace, in 1514, the crown had about £335,349 in 
reserves. By the end of Henry’s second war with France, Crown debts amounted to at 
least £177,590.
Again, these figures far from definitive, but if one takes it as representative of a 
general trend in finance, there are several things one can deduce from it. At the 
beginning of Henry VIII’s reign, the income of the crown far surpassed its expenditures,
4 R. Brown, ed., Calendar o f State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the 
Archives and Collections of Venice and other Libraries in Northern Italy. IV, 694.
and Herny VIII was in an excellent position financially. He took advantage of this 
between 1511-1514 and went to war with France. Between 1515 and 1517, England 
began to go into debt. By 1517, Wolsey was able to get England out of that situation, 
though very narrowly. Obviously, the royal treasury could not finance another war at that 
time. During the years of peace between 1518 and 1521, that gap narrowed, and the 
government maintained a small surplus, though nothing close to what it had before. 
Finally, in 1521 war came again and diminished that surplus exponentially while costs 
increased just as much. This plunged England into debt in 1522-1523, a debt from which 
it did not recover. Even though Wolsey and Henry raised additional revenues in the 
parliament of 1523, there was no possibility of surmounting the debt any time soon.
This financial picture explains a great deal about Wolsey’s financial policies 
during the “Great Enterprise.” On the eve of the second war with France in 1521, 
Wolsey only enjoyed a surplus of about £390,698. The first invasion had cost twice that 
sum, and, in addition to the war, there were regular expenses of court. Charles V planned 
to come to England, and Wolsey needed to have a clear idea of how much money he 
could contribute to the war effort in order to settle negotiations with the Empire. Since 
there was no surplus as there had been in 1513, he might have known that he would have 
to raise that money through taxation. However, Parliament was reluctant to agree to such 
sums. Therefore Wolsey had to have something to prove England’s wealth, thereby 
persuading both parliament and the Emperor that England would be ready for war. He 
had boasted in 1521 that England was a “mighty power and puissaunt realme.”5 The time 
had come to prove it. Therefore, in 1522 he undertook an unprecedented assessment of 
English wealth, comparable to the Domesday Book. In order both to gain time for these
preparations and to delay the war, he wrote to Charles asking him to postpone his visit to 
England until 1522 (it was originally supposed to be at Easter 1521).6 This bought 
Wolsey more time before having to commit to anything, and it gave him an excellent 
weapon to use against parliament when he finally summoned it in 1523. The proscription 
of 1522 counted every household in every county valued at £20 a year or more in lands. 
It assessed how many able-bodied men each family might be willing to provide and how 
much money in taxes they would be able to afford. The results came to about £455,000,7 
which was used in order to gain two loans from the realm in 1522-1523.
*A1I amounts for all of the following charts are in £ sterling*
Income
Exchequer Chamber Savings French Pensions Extraordinary Total
1509 44560 66176 1300000 21316 0 1432052
1510 44560 66176 0 21316 0 132052
1511 44560 66176 0 21316 0 132052
1512 44560 66176 0 21316 74000 206052
1513 44560 66176 0 0 0 110736
1514 44560 66176 0 0 0 110736
1515 44560 66176 0 21316 0 132052
1516 44560 66176 0 21316 0 132052
1517 44560 66176 0 21316 260000 392052
1518 44560 66176 0 21316 0 132052
1519 44560 66176 0 21316 0 132052
1520 44560 66176 0 21316 0 132052
1521 44560 66176 0 21316 215820 347872
1522 44560 66176 0 0 269841 380577
1523 44560 66176 0 0 269841 380577
1524 44560 66176 0 0 425359 536095
1525 44560 66176 0 21316 237143 369195
5 Edward Hall, Chronicle. 626.
6 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 2164
7 J.J. Goring, “The General Proscription of 1522,” The English Historical Review 86 (1971), 681-705.
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Expenditure
Exchequer Chamber War Total
1509 76503 65097 1231 142831
1510 76503 26725 1775 105003
1511 76503 64157 1509 142169
1512 76503 269564 181468 527535
1513 76503 699714 0 776217
1514 76503 155757 0 232260
1515 76503 74006 120000 270509
1516 76503 106429 120000 302932
1517 76503 72359 40000 188862
1518 76503 50614 40000 167117
1519 76503 52428 200 129131
1520 76503 86030 0 162533
1521 76503 15667 0 92170
1522 76503 15667 966570 1058740
1523 76503 15667 194570 286740
1524 76503 168157 325362 570022
1525 76503 168157 74570 319230
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Totals
Income Expenditure
1509 1432052 142831
1510 1316270 105003
1511 1306153 142169
1512 984670 527535
1513 319189 776217
1514 197665 232260
1515 65613 270509
1516 -105267 302932
1517 97923 188862
1518 62858 167117
1519 27793 129131
1520 -2688 162533
1521 253014 92170
1522 -425149 1058740
1523 -331312 286740
1524 -365239 570022
1525 -315274 319230
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This proscription of 1522 was also used during Wolsey’s parliament in 1523. He 
knew exactly how much each county would be able to contribute, and used that 
information when he addressed the parliament. His demand of £800,000, on top of the 
loans he was currently collecting, seems astronomical. However, if one considers the 
financial situation of 1523, his request becomes clearer. The crown was in debt 
£193,628. The last war had cost £776,217. Wolsey needed both enough money to bring 
Henry out of debt and to finance the war, meaning that he needed at least £969,845. So 
he was asking for significantly less than he needed, and, as John Guy has suggested, this 
was probably a bargaining ploy (implying that Wolsey did not have an exact idea of how 
much money he needed).8 However, even if the loans and taxes collected in full, Wolsey 
still needed £514,845 at a minimum. One can understand both why he kept parliament in 
session so long and why he was infuriated at the Commons when they would not grant 
him the sum he demanded. It explains his colorful statement that “he would rather have 
his tongue, plucked out of his hedde with a paire of pinsons, then to move the kyng to 
take any less some.”9 This parliament was not summoned merely to raise money for war, 
though that was a very important part of it, but because “the yere following, the kyng and 
the Emperour should make suche warre in Fraunce, as hath not bene sene.”10 It was 
summoned to do “. . .  no thyng but the common weale,” which meant keeping the king on 
a good financial footing.
This led to the debacle of Wolsey’s financial policy, the Amicable Grant of 1525. 
This loan was yet another attempt to bring the Crown out of desperate financial 
difficulties. The war that parliament had refused to finance properly had pushed the king
8 John Guy, “Wolsey and the Parliament of 1523,” Law and Government under the Tudors. 1-18.
9 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 2484.
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£177,590 into debt with expenses still running at £319,230 per annum. Wolsey somehow 
had to raise at least £496,820 just to balance the books. Without a king in good financial 
standing, the commons could not be defended against the French enemy and the 
government might go bankrupt. Wolsey probably could not comprehend why the House 
of Commons was being so uncooperative, as he wrote the Duke of Norfolk that it “be 
somewhat to the Kinges and my marvaile” that the commons “have not wel and ripely 
understonden such devices and communication . . .  as hath passed upon the present 
charge to you comitted. . . . (meaning to collect the money for the Amicable Grant).”11 
This was an attempt to lessen English financial difficulties as much as possible, but as 
before, it was unsuccessful. Wolsey was unable to muster the support of the Commons 
and to gain money from an unpopular medium (taxation). Despite the fact that this was 
the King’s policy, it was associated with Wolsey and, as a natural consequence,
1 9unpopular with the people.
All of these financial troubles, one could argue, explain Wolsey’s constant delays 
in executing military policy. J. J. Scarisbrick has argued that Wolsey did not always
1 "Xfollow through on the King’s wishes, and sought peace in Christendom. Peter Gwyn 
and George Bernard have successfully argued against Scarisbrick and claimed that 
Wolsey did indeed follow the King’s policy.14 However, in light of the figures for 
revenues given above, one can see how Scarisbrick, Gwyn, and Bernard all had gotten
10 Hall, Chronicle. 284-285.
11 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. IV, 571
12 Peter Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal: The Rise and Fall o f Cardinal Wolsey. (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 
1990), 370.
13 J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIIL (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1968), 67-96.
14 Cf. George Bernard, War Taxation and Rebellion in Earlv Tudor England. (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1986). And Peter Gwvn. The King’s Cardinal.
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certain things correct. Wolsey was delaying, not only because he desired peace, but 
because he did not have the financial ability to pursue war to the fullest.
The Treaty of London was meant to buy time for England, allowing her to get her 
financial books in order and prepare for the inevitable English involvement in the 
Habsburg-Valois conflict. Keeping the appearance of peace was much less expensive 
than war. The entire Field of the Cloth of Gold cost only £15,000,15 Wolsey’s entry into 
Bruges £2,400, Charles V’s entry into London a mere £20,000.16 It was much cheaper 
for England to put on these shows of power and magnificence than it was to finance a
I 7
war. In addition, Wolsey loved pomp and splendor; it would be no wonder that he 
reveled in this role of “peacemaker” of Europe.
The conferences at Calais and Bruges were again meant to buy time.18 England 
had a surplus of £390,698 in 1521, and if Wolsey could keep that surplus for as long as 
possible, the better prepared Henry VIII would be to make war on France. Wolsey’s 
desire for peace might have stemmed from the £287,465 debt that England had incurred 
from some minor skirmishes in France and the possibility of an even larger invasion in 
1522. The advantage of “peace” would be that Wolsey could call Parliament, raise taxes, 
and not have to pay anything until 1524, by which time he might have been able to 
collect as much as £539,682. This would have brought England temporarily out of debt 
and perhaps even finance another small-scale invasion of France. Thus, in this context 
the delays that Scarisbrick noticed could easily have been motivated by financial 
concerns. Indeed, Wolsey said in 1522 that he was delaying because “such a truce once
15 Peter Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal. 359.
16 Sydney Anglo, Spectacle. Pageantry and Earlv Tudor Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 175.
17 Peter Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal. 20.
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had, God may inspire in the minds of Christian princes to condescend into a further 
peace.”19
This plan went awiy when the Due de Bourbon rebelled against Francis I and 
decided to support the war effort of Charles V. The chance to use Bourbon’s powerful 
army and to take advantage of France’s division could not be lost. Because of Bourbon, 
the war might very well turn against France. Wolsey and Henry could not afford to miss 
this chance; consequently the need for money was even more desperate. Even so, 
Wolsey wrote that “there is no good war commenced or continued but only to the extent 
to conduce and bring once a good peace.”20 So he was still trying to delay things; 
however, the king’s indebtedness by then was £193,628, and so it would have been best 
for England to obtain a peace on advantageous terms.
By the time Bourbon’s and the allies’ plan finally collapsed early in 1524, 
England’s debt was £227,555, the greatest ever. Wolsey made peace with Francis in that 
year. It is quite likely that this alliance was not a part of Wolsey’s grand scheme for 
universal peace; he entered into that accord for more practical reasons. Things were not 
going as well for the Empire at that time, and it was in the best interests of England to 
conclude the “Great Enterprise.”21
Wolsey’s diplomatic and financial policy had failed miserably, and he has been 
accused by some historians of not grasping the financial gravity of the situation. F. C. 
Dietz stated that, “he did nothing which indicates that he saw that, since the small margin 
between income and disbursements gave the king no opportunity to save much money,
18 Peter Gwyn, “Wolsey’s Foreign Policy: The Conferences at Calais and Bruges Reconsidered,” The 
Historical Journal 23 (1980), 755-772.
19 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 2764.
20 Ibid, IV, 61.
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and taxation could not be depended upon to provide rapidly and abundantly enough the 
money needed for wars. . . .” However, this is not altogether true. Wolsey, given his 
management of parliament in 1523 and his constant demands for money, appears to have 
at least some idea of that “margin” and thought that keeping England at peace and 
delaying war was the best tactic. That tactic would give England enough time to obtain 
additional tax receipts. What he did not see was that such a policy was impossible given 
the circumstances of the “Great Enterprise.” His delays with the Empire were not due to 
of war. Wolsey probably wished to gain the best possible position for his 
did not have the resources to carry out fully what was demanded of him.
detestation 
master, but
21 George Bernard, War. Taxation, and Rebellion. 45.
22 F. C. Dietz. English Government Finance. 102.
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Chapter 6
Cardinal Wolsey: Pro-France 1524-1525
In light of the financial problems that England was facing in 1524, it is not 
hard to see why Wolsey sought to ally England with France and again secure peace. 
England was now in such terrible shape financially that it was essential for Wolsey to 
take England out of war and to try to correct these financial problems with taxation: 
hence the so-called Amicable Grant of 1525. It was an honest attempt at remedying 
English financial deficits, and, indeed one can see how it increased royal income. 
However, even measures such as that could not eradicate the heavy debt and 
insurmountable expenses that England faced in 1524. Therefore, it also made sense 
to ally with France. The Empire was faltering militarily, the Due de Bourbon, the 
Great Enterprise’s hope, had collapsed, Clement VII and Louise of Savoy had both 
asked for peace, and Wolsey told Henry that a peace policy was expedient for “the 
king’s highness and his council.”1 Of course, what happened at Pavia in 1525 was 
unforeseeable and proved to be Wolsey’s final, fatal mistake during the Great 
Enterprise.
Wolsey probably thought, understandably, that in the circumstances in 1524, 
the war could not end in Imperial victory. He told the English ambassadors in Spain 
that “it is more necessary to lean unto the peace.”2 He also insisted that Bourbon 
would not be given more money until his invasion was successful, an outcome which
1 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. IV, 61.
2 Ibid, 186.
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was beginning to look more and more unlikely.3 Indeed, a few months later, Bourbon 
was routed at Marseilles. All Wolsey needed was an official excuse to repudiate the 
Habsburgs and break his traditional policy of delay. This opportunity came when 
news of the papal election arrived in England in December 1523. In one of the 
dispatches from an Imperial ambassador to Charles, Wolsey’s displeasure is clearly 
apparent: “The Sieur Legate has informed me, that he has received news from Rome, 
which in nowise to anticipate any great advantage from Pace’s mission (to the Due de 
Bourbon).. . .  This he said with a change of colour and manifest anger... .”4
Thus in October 1524 Wolsey told the king that it “might right well do this 
feat (the invasion of France) without the emperor.” Clearly it would be impossible 
for Henry to consider invading France alone, and Wolsey was saying, in essence, that 
Henry would receive no help from Charles. Therefore, it was best to get out of the 
war before England wasted even more money. Even after Pavia, this attitude colored 
Wolsey’s feelings toward the Emperor. He did not think that Charles would really 
help Henry redraw the boundaries of Europe and he remarked to Henry that there 
could be nothing gained from an invasion of France at that time.6
Given the financial limitations and the weakness of the Empire in 1524, Henry 
and Wolsey had two options. They could either break the imperial alliance 
completely, abandon the Great Enterprise, and thus leave themselves politically 
isolated; or they could ally themselves with France and at least hope to regain some
3 Ibid, 384.
4 William Bradford, Correspondence of the Emperor Charles V. 33.
5 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. IV, 1249.
6 Ibid, 1371.
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of the honor they had lost. The French pensions would start coming again, which 
might help to ease the financial burden and perhaps, if imperial fortunes continued, 
England could aid France against the Emperor in Italy and hope to gain some part in a 
military victory that had been denied Henry for the past year. Obviously, Henry and 
Wolsey chose the latter of those two options. Thus, after secret negotiations with the 
French for several months, Wolsey, somewhat against Henry’s wishes, switched sides
n
and allied England with France.
Unfortunately, Wolsey switched sides too soon and tied his master 
diplomatically to a monarch now in captivity. It was a diplomatic catastrophe. Henry 
immediately switched sides again and tried to claim his title of King of France one 
last time. He wrote to the Emperor and sent ambassadors to draw up plans for the 
next invasion of France, and for the division of French lands between Bourbon,
o
Henry, and Charles. He charged Wolsey with the task of financing this war - this 
provoked the Amicable Grant. However, Charles was not eager to start another war, 
especially in alliance with Henry VIII, who had not proven to be most reliable. He 
snubbed Henry, repudiated the alliance, and married Isabella of Portugal.9 In 
addition, Louise of Savoy, now regent of France, was unhappy with Henry’s sudden 
volte face after Francis’s capture, and saw it as a repudiation of the negotiations of 
1524. Therefore, England was now more politically isolated than it had ever been 
before. None of the powers of Europe was allied with Henry, and Wolsey’s 
diplomatic policy had failed miserably.
7 Ibid, 671.
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Wolsey also blundered in his domestic policy. The enforcement of the 
Amicable Grant came close to bringing rebellion in some areas, and Henry had to 
intervene personally on Wolsey’s behalf. Wolsey, having exhausted the possibilities 
for taxation, forced loans, and benevolences, had no way of getting England out of 
debt. No Parliament would grant him anything, and the prospects for the future 
looked extremely dim. Wolsey’s popularity had reached an all time low, and, as Hall 
states “the people cursed the cardinal.”10
Declining to disentangle England from European affairs, Wolsey insisted that 
England now had to make overtures to France against the Empire.11 However, 
Francis was still in captivity and Henry resented having to abandon his traditional ally
19and to make overtures to a traditional enemy. In addition, the outlook for financing 
even more diplomatic maneuvering was less likely than it had been five years ago. 
Wolsey had brought England to the brink of bankruptcy, and had no hope of 
reversing the situation soon. The prospect of maintaining Henry’s accustomed place 
in European politics was now slimmer than it had been since he had ascended the 
throne.
What exactly was Wolsey’s “policy” in 1518-1525? He supported Henry’s 
wars, for political reasons if not for personal ones. If that is true, why have his tactics 
of delay persuaded some scholars that he was acting contrary to Henry? In fact, his 
delays served Henry’s wishes as well. The invasion of 1513 severely depleted royal
8 Ibid, 1212.
9 Ibid, 1379.
10 Edward Hall, Chronicle. 700.
11 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. VII, 1114.
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financial reserves. The result forced Wolsey to pursue a peace policy that culminated 
in the treaty of 1518. The purpose of the treaty was not only to promote universal 
peace but also to give the royal treasury time to get back on sound financial footing. 
During the intervening years, Wolsey streamlined government finances and brought 
glory to his master. He streamlined the household in 1519 in order to make it more 
efficient,13 he started reforms in Star Chamber and the King’s Bench,14 and he had the 
king declared Defender of the Faith in 1521.15 In other words, he saved money and 
instituted changes that would help England be more effective in the prosecution of 
war when it came again.
What kept him from success, however, was the state of royal finances. 
Between 1518 and 1521, he had not had enough time to make all of the reforms, 
financial gains, and political ties that he needed. Delay was essential. His policy was 
to postpone any military action in Europe in order to get those reforms finished, in the 
hopes of successfully prosecuting a war when it occurred. Unfortunately, he deferred 
things too long. Through his constant prevaricating, he angered the rest of Europe 
and brought both himself and his king to the brink of bankruptcy, ultimately losing 
face in the eyes of the monarchs he had hoped to impress.
Henry simply did not have the resources to make himself as powerful as 
Francis or Charles. Henry wanted to be a great figure on the European stage, but left 
the details to Wolsey. As it happened, Wolsey was able to bring glory to his master
12 Ibid, IV 3105.
13 Edward Hall, Chronicle. 597.
14 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. Ill, 1283, 1293.
15 Ibid, W , 1656.
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until 1525. By then, the crown’s resources were so depleted that Henry could no 
longer afford to be the great arbiter that he had been. Wolsey still tried to please 
Henry, and, by doing so only made things worse. By 1525, his attempts to please 
Henry had angered the king, and he finally failed -  the victim of the enormous 
pressures that all of Europe had placed upon him.
However, Wolsey also had his own ambitions. He himself reveled in the 
pomp and pageantry of the European stage.16 Kings, Emperors, and rulers of Europe 
were courting his favor. He was given titles such as Cardinalis Pacificus and 
“Arbiter of Europe” by Francis and Charles, and was affectionately called “my good 
friend’ by Louise of Savoy, and the “Lover of Peace” by Margaret of Austria.17 He 
had an extraordinary ego, and this praise by important people would only have fed it 
further. One only has to look at the pageants Wolsey patronized at his own court, to 
see how much he cherished his role as diplomat. All of them centered around the
|  A
theme of Wolsey’s diplomatic triumphs and his dedication to the cause of peace. 
Peace also allowed Wolsey to further his ambitions in England. Because of overtures 
of peace by the pope, Wolsey became a legatus a latere. Royal financial strain 
allowed Wolsey to gain more control over the king’s household and he was able to 
dismiss many of his enemies. When peace came, Wolsey gained the respect of 
Erasmus and Thomas More, men whom Henry VIII admired, and thus, Wolsey 
gained standing with him as well. Edward Hall described Wolsey as a man “more
16 Peter Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal. 20.
11 Ibid, m , 1694.
18 Sydney Anglo, Spectacle. Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy. 225-231.
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profitable than honourable,”19 and peace would not only profit the king financially, 
but also Wolsey personally. Rarely would the son of an Ipswich butcher be able to 
overshadow the Holy Roman Emperor, and that fact was one that Wolsey certainly 
would have understood. If war came, it would jeopardize Wolsey’s situation among 
the monarchs of Europe. If it did not, Wolsey would continue to be a leading actor at 
the center of a European stage.
19 Edward Hall, Chronicle. 707.
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Conclusion
After Charles’s victory at Pavia, the “Great Enterprise” officially ended. 
Henry and Francis allied themselves against Charles V and threatened an invasion of 
Germany. After 1525, Henry VIII’s desires for military conquest, for marriage 
between his daughter, Mary, and Charles, and his dream of being as great a king as 
his ancestor, Henry V, were at an end. Or so it seems. Just because Henry had not 
achieved his dreams in 1525 does not necessarily mean he gave them up altogether. 
In fact, he tried again to conquer France in 1544. The failures of 1525 called for a 
change in strategy. The first part of that strategy was to put the royal treasury back on 
sound financial footing. Henry VIII was no longer able to get money out of 
Parliament because Wolsey had angered its members with his treatment of them in 
1523 and again in 1525 with the Amicable Grant.1 The easiest way to fill the treasury 
again, in Henry’s mind, was to find a way of obtaining more of the church’s wealth. 
Cardinal Wolsey, whose influence with the king was already dwindling because of 
his diplomatic failure, was the first barrier that Henry VIII had to remove in order to 
get at that wealth.
Henry was greatly angered at Wolsey after Charles refused to stage a second 
invasion of France. So great was this snub that the ambassadors reported that Charles 
would do “little or nothing. . . to your [Henry VIH’s] commodity, profit or benefit.” 
As if that were not enough, Wolsey was now negotiating with Louise of Savoy, who 
had been England’s enemy only a few months previously, and expelled the imperial
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ambassador, Louis de Praet, from England.3 Wolsey was now firmly allied with 
France and could not maneuver between France and the Empire as he had done 
previously. Also, he made two trips to France to visit the Queen Mother, Louise of 
Savoy, and the two publicly denounced Charles V as a liar.4 Wolsey even celebrated 
this pro-French policy in his palace of Hampton Court with sumptuous pageants 
representing the benefits of a French alliance.5 The first hint of Henry VIII’s 
dissatisfaction with Wolsey came at the end of 1525, when Henry took Hampton 
Court from him.6
Wolsey had isolated himself politically. In theory, Wolsey was still following 
the same policy he had been using since 1518. He tried to make Henry VIII a player 
in European politics and to bring gloiy to him. It just so happened that Wolsey was 
no longer able to ally Henry VIII with Charles V because he had angered Charles so 
much with his constant delays during the ‘‘Great Enterprise.” The alliance with 
France could afford England the opportunity to stay at peace and get her finances in 
order. It also kept Henry VIII from being cut off diplomatically, in case there was 
some sort of alliance between Charles and Francis. At any rate, it was unlikely that 
there would be another war for awhile (Francis I was a captive of Charles V and 
France was as not financially prepared to fight another war). Given the chance, 
Wolsey probably would have continued reforming the household, calling parliaments,
1 Roger Schofield, ‘Taxation and the political limits o f the Tudor state,” in Clare Cross, David Loades, 
and J. J. Scarisbrick, Law and Government under the Tudors. 228-229.
2 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. IV, 1371.
3 J. Bergenroth, Calendar o f State Papers. Spanish. HI, 51.
4 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. IV, 1380.
5 Sydney Anglo, Spectacle. Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy. 208.
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and forcing loans as he had done in the 1520s. However, that would have taken a 
great deal of time, and Henry VIII still wanted to make war on France. Henry argued 
with Wolsey on this point, claiming he would only agree to peace with France if 
Francis offered him land, preferably land in the North of France which could serve as 
a launching point for another invasion.7 Henry VIII could not invade France with 
Wolsey’s alliance in effect. He wanted to invade again and he needed the money to 
do it. The only way to ensure that both those things would happen was to remove 
Wolsey.
As early as 1523 Henry VIII had tried to tax the church in order to pay for his
o
wars. Wolsey stood in the way and softened the blow to the church. Though 
Wolsey’s general proscription called for an assessment of “all spiritual dignities and 
benefices” several exemptions were granted to the clergy. Also, the commissioners 
who appraised the gentry did not appraise the clergy. Wolsey appointed different 
commissioners to assess the value of the clergy’s benefices and, according to Peter 
Gwyn, this assessment was “economical.”9 Wolsey also had a reputation for 
insulating the church from lay attacks. In 1515, at Baynard’s castle, in an attempt to 
shelter the church from taxation and to protect some of its privileges, Wolsey knelt 
before Henry asking him to protect the liberties of the church, to which Henry
6 Peter Gwvn. The King’s Cardinal. 28.
7 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. IV, 3105.
8 Richard Hoyle, “War and Public Finance,” 86.
9 Peter Gwyn, The Kind’s Cardinal. 311-313.
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refused.10 If Henry was to get money from the church, Wolsey would most likely try 
to block it.
Coincidentally, at the same time that Henry VIII was looking for ways to tax 
the church, he was also seeking divorce from Catherine of Aragon in order to secure a 
male heir to the throne. In 1527, when Wolsey was in France, Henry VIII 
commissioned research on the Collectanea satis copiosa which, among other things, 
produced arguments for his own temporal jurisdiction over the church, a perfect 
justification for more clerical taxation. Even the divorce may have its roots in the 
diplomatic failure of 1525. Henry VIII had secured a marriage for Mary to Charles V 
in 1522 and claimed that Charles would become “lord and owner. . . of all 
Christendom.”11 With a marriage between Charles and Mary, Henry secured the 
succession of his daughter with the aid of a powerful husband from the Habsburg 
family. This would have been an acceptable proposition, considering the Tudors had 
been allied with the Habsburgs since the late fifteenth century. But in 1525 Charles 
promised to marry Isabella of Portugal, and therefore Henry VTIFs designs to ensure 
the succession of his daughter were dashed. It is true that after 1525 Mary was 
betrothed to the French dauphin. However, that would mean that eventually a French 
king would have sat on the English throne, a prospect unacceptable to many 
Englishmen, including Henry himself, and it was unlikely that Henry would have a 
son and heir with the now aging Catherine of Aragon.
10 John Guy, Tudor England. 110.
11 J. S. Brewer, Letters and Papers. IV, 1212.
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Therefore, one can see that the failure of the “Great Enterprise” had 
significant ramifications for England and for Henry VIII. It left the royal treasury in 
need of money, and, if Henry VIII wished to continue making war against France, he 
needed money fast. Wolsey might have been able to bring England out of debt 
eventually, but considering his failure in obtaining Henry’s martial desires between 
1518 and 1524, and the diplomatic overtures he was making to France in 1525, that 
prospect looked even more unlikely. The easiest way for Henry to obtain money was 
through clerical taxation. Wolsey would serve as an additional obstacle to that 
because he had defended the church in the past (as one would expect him to do).
One can see that the “Great Enterprise” and Wolsey’s diplomatic and financial 
failures force historians to ask several new questions. Did Wolsey’s failure to obtain 
Henry VTII’s divorce in 1529 bring down the cardinal or was it his failure to obtain 
Henry VIII’s conquest of France? How precisely did Henry VIII’s bankruptcy and 
subsequent search for clerical taxation lead to the jurisdictional revolution of the 
1530s? It would take a great deal more research to answer these questions 
completely. However, this study of Wolsey and his failure in 1525 has led me to 
believe that the impact of Henry Vffl’s wars has been overlooked to a certain extent. 
Wolsey’s failure to obtain Henry VUI’s conquest of France certainly did contribute-to 
his downfall. Henry VIII’s bankruptcy and search for clerical taxation arguably did 
eventually shape the political Reformation of the 1530s. In this sense it could be 
argued that there would have been a reformation without Anne Boleyn. Of course, 
there are many other circumstances that contributed to the break with Rome.
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However, 1525 became a turning point in Wolsey’s fortunes and ultimately those of 
all of England. In his play Henry VIII Shakespeare’s Cardinal Wolsey claimed in 
reference to Anne Boleyn “There was the weight that pull’d me down. . . . The king 
has gone beyond me: all my glories in that one woman [Anne Boleyn] I have lost 
forever. . . .”12 This paper has suggested that the issue is more complex, and 
historians will need to re-examine both the reasons for Wolsey’s fall and the origins 
of the English Reformation.
12 William Shakespeare, Henry VIII. Act EH, Scene II.
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